William & Mary Law Review
Volume 54 (2012-2013)
Issue 3 Law Without a Lawmaker Symposium

Article 7

February 2013

How Customary is Customary International Law?
Emily Kadens
Ernest A. Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Repository Citation
Emily Kadens and Ernest A. Young, How Customary is Customary International Law?, 54 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 885 (2013), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss3/7
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

HOW CUSTOMARY IS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?

EMILY KADENS* & ERNEST A. YOUNG**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. AN INTELLECTUAL GENEALOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE HISTORY OF CUSTOM AND CURRENT DEBATES
ABOUT CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Practice and the Extra Ingredient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Theory and Practice of Custom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Customary Law and Contemporary
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

886
888
906
907
911
914
920

* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Kadens would
like to thank the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress for the time and
support to pursue this research.
** Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. We are grateful to Michael Green and the
Institute of Bill of Rights Law for the opportunity to participate in the Symposium “Law
Without a Lawmaker” at William & Mary Law School on February 24-25, 2012.

885

886

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:885

INTRODUCTION
The ambiguity of the lawmaker has long been a central problem
in international law. Writing in the positivist tradition, H.L.A. Hart
famously doubted that international law is law at all because it
lacks not only a single sovereign lawmaker but also a system of
“secondary rules” for the making and alteration of legal norms.1
Treaties bind by consent, but only between the parties. Even when
large majorities of countries sign on to multilateral agreements, we
often lack any authoritative method for determining those agreements’ meaning or guaranteeing consistent enforcement. In any
event, treaty law leaves large gaps,2 and often those gaps exist in
those areas with the most pressing need for law. In an earlier age,
international lawyers frequently turned to natural law to fill these
gaps,3 but a revival of the natural law tradition seems unlikely at a
time when countries with widely varying religious, philosophical,
and political traditions aspire to agree on one international law.4
Enter custom—the only form of law without a lawmaker still
recognized in our post-lapsarian world. At certain times and places
in world history, custom is thought to have given rise to a coherent
and effective set of legal norms “from the bottom up”—that is,
without the command of a single sovereign.5 If merchants operating
across state borders over time can produce a set of customary rules
1. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961). Professor Hart’s specific take on
international law masks a considerably more complicated relation between his rethinking of
positivism and the notion of customary law. See generally Frederick Schauer, The
Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176807.
2. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L.
115, 116 n.2 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 11 (1999) (discussing naturalist
writers on international law such as Grotius and Pufendorff).
4. But see Bruce P. Frohnen, Multicultural Rights? Natural Law and the Reconciliation
of Universal Norms with Particular Cultures, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 39 (2002) (arguing for such
a revival).
5. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The
Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 129 n.7 (2005) (describing
“bottom-up lawmaking” as “a process whereby discrete groups of transnational practitioners
translate their practices and customs into code-like rules that ultimately harden into law”).
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to govern their transactions, even without formal consent or the
intervention of a sovereign authority,6 then perhaps independent
nations similarly can derive binding norms of conduct from their
own practices. Conventional wisdom in international law thus holds
that the international community has developed a set of definable
rules through custom that nations must accept as law.7 This wisdom
rests on extrapolation from the historical success of custom in
commercial law. On this view, customary international law derives
its appeal not only from a fear that it may be the only game in town
but also from a widely held sense that it is, well, customary.
We question that latter assumption in this Article by comparing
early theories of custom with the debates in which publicists engage
today. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice asserts that custom, defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” forms a fundamental part of international
law.8 This assumption about the role of custom has a well-known
history extending back to the writings of the Spanish theologian
Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), who equated the law of nations with
custom in his Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver of 1613.9 This
history, however, has a prehistory that modern scholars do not know
as well, and that prehistory sheds some interesting light on current
debates about the usefulness of the standard definition of custom.
The value of studying history lies not in any claim that premodern jurists had better answers than do scholars today, but rather in
a historical perspective on the problem of how custom functions as
law. That problem, then as now, remains largely intractable. The
debates among jurists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
mirror the debates in which their intellectual descendants engage
hundreds of years later. The story of custom, in both its past and
present manifestations, thus underscores contemporary doubts
6. But see Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1153, 1177-81 (2012) (arguing that premodern merchant custom was not transnational but
rather local).
7. See, e.g., Gerald Postema, Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice
Account, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 279, 279, 282 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine &
James B. Murphy eds., 2007).
8. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
9. 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ 351 (bk.
2, ch. 20, § 1) (Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown & John Waldron eds. & trans., 1944).
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about the usefulness of customary law on the international plane.
Part I of this Article surveys the historical development of customary law. Part II ventures some suggestions as to what that history
can tell us about current debates over customary international law.
I. AN INTELLECTUAL GENEALOGY
Following the parameters laid down in Roman law,10 the medieval
jurists believed that custom consisted of acts, repeated with some
degree of frequency over some period of time, that the community
—or some part thereof—understood itself to be obligated to continue
performing due to its tacitus consensus, a phrase usually translated
as “tacit consent.”11 Scholars of customary international law today
begin, whether in support or opposition, from nearly identical premises.12
Nearly, that is, but not quite identical, for modern publicists generally use the principles of state action plus opinio iuris (the sense
of being bound) to define custom.13 Some publicists have claimed
that the nineteenth-century replacement of tacit consent with opinio
iuris represented a distinct caesura with a premodern approach of
lesser sophistication and usefulness.14 The older so-called consent
10. For the Roman definition, see 2 CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS: CODEX IUSTINIANUS Cod.
8.52(53).1-.2, at 362 (Paul Krueger ed., 1906); 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, primarily Dig.
1.3.32-.35, at 13 (Alan Watson ed., 1985).
11. See, e.g., Raphael M. Walden, The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary
International Law, 12 ISR. L. REV. 344, 344 (1977).
12. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary
International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 44 (2010) (“[T]he combined objective and
subjective inquiries for CIL formation (state practice and opinio juris) remain the crucial
algorithm for establishing whether a norm really rises to the level of international custom.”);
Postema, supra note 7, at 281-82, 285, 287-88 (criticizing the traditional theory and offering
a new theory that still speaks of “normative,” habitual behavior that the agent understands
ought to be followed).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) cmt. c (1987); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757-58 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Paul Guggenheim, L’Origine de la notion de “l’opinio juris sive necessitatis”
comme deuxième élément de la coutume dans l’histoire du droit des gens, in HOMMAGE D’UNE
GÉNÉRATION DE JURISTES AU PRÉSIDENT BASDEVANT 258, 259-60 (1960); Brigitte Stern, Custom
at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 89, 95 (2001); see also ALAN
WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW 92 (expanded ed. 2001) (discussing the
roots of the concept of opinio iuris).
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theory suggested a sort of contractual basis to custom. The medieval
jurists did sometimes describe the workings of custom in contractual
language, speaking of tacitus consensus and asking, for example,
whether all members of a community, including those lacking
capacity to contract, had to give their consent.15 But the Latin word
consensus had subtler meanings than just “consent” in a purely
contractual sense. One of the leading Latin dictionaries defines the
word variously as “agreement, accordance, unanimity, [and] concord.”16 The jurists’ discussions of custom make clear that they did
not hold simplistic, contractual views of custom formation. In fact,
modern scholars will hear in the voices of the medieval jurists much
that will sound familiar.
The medieval jurists recognized that humans engaged in many
types of repeat behavior, not all of which rose to the level of custom
as law.17 Individuals acquired habits; family, social, or occupational
groups developed preferred practices; courts and chanceries established styles, for instance for documents or procedures. None of
these habits, usages, practices, or styles constituted customary law,
despite the fact that in colloquial speech any of them might be
referred to as a custom.18 The jurists needed a way to distinguish
mere nonbinding practices from binding customary law, and they
found this in the interlocking criteria of duration, repetition, and
tacitus consensus.
Duration proved to be the least controversial issue, though not for
lack of options. Custom was, by its nature, defined by tradition. As
the great fourteenth-century Italian jurist Bartolus de Sassoferrato
(1313-1357) wrote, “A statute obtains [its] consent expressly, and
therefore does not require other conjectures [about its existence].
15. Walter Ullmann, Bartolus on Customary Law, 52 JURID. REV. 265, 269-70, 272-73
(1940).
16. CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, A LATIN DICTIONARY: FOUNDED ON ANDREWS’
EDITION OF FREUND’S LATIN DICTIONARY 428 (1955).
17. See, e.g., Ullmann, supra note 15, at 265-66. We will call custom having the force of
law “customary law,” but this should not be confused with other uses of that term to indicate,
for example, written and codified customs. Cf. JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY:
AN INTRODUCTION 85-86 (2008) (discussing the anthropological use of the term “customary
law” as referring to the “artificial construction by colonial administrators to rule according to
the practices of the subjugated peoples”).
18. BARTOLUS, IN PRIMAM DIGESTI VETERIS PARTEM COMMENTARIA 19r. (Turin, Nicholaus
Beuilaquam 1574) (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, §§ 6, 10).
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But custom requires tacit [consent]. Therefore a long passage of
time is necessary, so that [the custom] may become apparent
through the consent of the people and their perseverance [in the
act].”19 Although some jurists initially thought that the duration
requirement meant “since time immemorial,”20 and others argued
for the canon law rules of forty years, the scholarly consensus soon
coalesced around ten years21 “provided that uniform and frequent
acts occurred within this period.”22 A longer period, of course, made
the existence of the custom more certain, but only a decade was
needed.23
Frequency of acts proved more difficult to pin down, but the requirement was important because the jurists saw repetition of
behavior as a key indicator of tacitus consensus.24 According to
Bartolus, “[T]he people are not understood to have consented, unless
the act occurs frequently.”25 How many times during a decade did an
act have to be repeated in order for its repetition to establish the
requisite consent? Certainly “as many concrete instances would
have to be proved as would sufficiently indicate the tacit consent of
the people.”26 The Ordinary Gloss, the authoritative commentary
19. Ullmann, supra note 15, at 275 (“Lex habet consensum expressive, et ideo non
requiritur alia conjectura ... sed consuetudo requirit tacitum; ergo diuturnitas temporis
necessaria est, ut apparet de consensus populi et eius perseverantia.” (quoting Bartolus
repetitio ad Cod. 8.52.2, § 17)).
20. PLACENTINUS, SUMMA CODICIS 416 (photo. reprint 1962) (1536) (commenting on Cod.
8.52(53).1 and arguing that “custom is of long standing if it exceeds human memory”
[“consuetudinem esse longaeuam, hominumq[ue] excedere memoriam”]).
21. 1 ODOFREDUS, LECTURA SUPER DIGESTO VETERI 16r. (photo. reprint 1967) (1550)
(repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 15); see also BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19v. (repetitio ad Dig.
1.3.32, § 14); GLOSSA ORDINARIA at Dig. 1.3.32, v. inveterata; id. at Cod. 8.52(53).1 ad v. quae
sit longa consuetudo; Laurent Mayali, La coutume dans la doctrine romaniste au Moyen Age,
in 52 LA COUTUME 11, 25 (1990).
22. Ullmann, supra note 15, at 275.
23. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19v. (“If [the custom] is sanctioned by a long time, how
much more strongly by a very long time.” [“[S]i inducitur longo tempore, multo fortius
longissimo.”]).
24. See Ullmann, supra note 15, at 269, 276 (noting that “[t]he binding force of customs
was, therefore, ascribed to ... tacit consent” and describing frequency of a given act as an
indicator of consent).
25. Id. at 276 (citing Bartolus repetitio ad Cod. 8.52.2, § 12: “populus non videtur
consensisse, nisi frequenter illum actum exerceat”); BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19r. (repetitio
ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 10) (discussing [“tacit consent, which is gathered from usage and practices”]
“tacitus co[n]sensus, quod colligit[ur] ex usu, & moribus”).
26. Ullmann, supra note 15, at 279.
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written in the margins around the texts of the Roman law and
completed around 1230 by the Italian law professor Franciscus
Accursius (c. 1182-1263), promoted the idea that “twice makes a
custom,”27 but not everyone agreed. Some thought that when the
Roman law text on which they were all commenting said “frequenter” it literally meant “frequently,” and twice was not frequent.28 On the other end of the spectrum, the thirteenth-century
French law professor Jacques de Révigny (c. 1230-1296) effectively
foresaw the concept of “instant custom” when he offered this
hypothetical about the creation of the custom of primogenitor:
Assume that the whole population of a city, or a majority of it,
tacitly performs one act. We are at the beginning of the introduction of that custom by which the oldest son inherits everything.
At a certain time, that whole city went to war. All or almost all
the men were killed. On one day [their] sons adopt the usage
that the oldest son takes everything, and thus the people, or a
majority of them, have tacitly consented by one act. Is this
legislation? Certainly not, because something becomes a statute
by the means of express discussion among the community about
what shall be law in the future.29

As long as the community continued to maintain the usage of
primogenitor, he said, then the single act introduced a custom.30
But even if the jurists accepted the Gloss’s maxim that “twice
makes a custom,” they fretted over how that corresponded to the
duration requirement. For example, they argued over the customcreating efficacy of the following situation: An act happens on day
one, and is repeated the next day. Then ten years go by and the act
is not repeated again, though no one has opposed it. Is there a

27. GLOSSA ORDINARIA at Dig. 1.3.32 ad v. inveterata.
28. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 11).
29. L. WAELKENS, LA THÉORIE DE LA COUTUME CHEZ JACQUES DE RÉVIGNY 485 (repetitio
ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 2) (1984) (“Pone quod totus populus huius ciuitatis uel maior pars utuntur
uno actu tacite. Simus in initio introductionis illius consuetudinis quod maior natu habet
totum. Tota ista ciuitas quadam die iuit in exercitum. Omnes uel fere omnes mortui sunt. Filii
una die sic utuntur quod maior totum habet et sic tacite habetur consensus populi uel maioris
partis uno actu. Estne statutum? Certe non, quia statutum est habito tractatu in communi
et expresso quod sit ius in futurum.”).
30. Id. at 485-86.
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custom?31 Odofredus (d. 1265), who taught at the University of
Bologna in the first half of the thirteenth century, wrote that his
predecessors Johannes Bassianus (late twelfth century) and Azo
Porcius (fl. 1150-1230) believed that such a scenario did introduce
a custom.32 But Odofredus’s teacher, Jacobus Balduinus (d. 1225),
“hounded master Johannes and Azo to the ends of the earth,”33
arguing that “this certainly cannot be, because custom is said to be
a habitual practice, but can two acts or three be said to be a
habitual practice? Certainly not, because lawmakers disdain what
happens once or twice, and rights are adjusted to that which
happens frequently.”34 Odofredus, however, sided with Johannes
and Azo.35
Frequency of acts was important because the jurists held that the
requisite tacitus consensus was “deduced from usage and practice.”36
But they also realized that repeated acts may not be enough to
establish consent. This realization led them to raise the Austinian
question whether a custom needed to be decided in litigation before
it could be recognized as law.37 Some jurists believed that it did,38
and, according to Révigny, that was also the way ordinary people
thought. When confronted with a supposed custom, he said,
“[L]aymen ask, ‘Have you ever seen it judged?’”39 Révigny himself
disagreed with this proposition, pointing out that customs that were
31. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19v. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 17); 1 ODOFREDUS, supra
note 21, at 16r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 13).
32. 1 ODOFREDUS, supra note 21, at 16r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 13).
33. Id. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 14) (“scandalizavit dominus Johannem et Azonem usque
ad extremos indos”).
34. Id. (“[C]erte hoc esse non potest. quia [con]suetudo d[icitu]r usus co[n]suetus: sed
potest ne dici usus co[n]suetus binus usus vel trin[us] vsus certe no[n]: q[uia] que semel aut
bis accidunt despiciunt legislatores & ad ea que freque[n]ter accidunt iura adaptantur.”).
35. Id.
36. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 10) (“tacitus co[n]sensus,
quod colligit[ur] ex usu, & moribus”).
37. SIEGFRIED BRIE, DIE LEHRE VOM GEWOHNHEITSRECHT: EINE HISTORISCH-DOGMATISCHE
UNTERSUCHUNG 109-11 (Breslau, M. & H. Marcus 1899) (discussing the importance of this
issue to the medieval jurists); WATSON, supra note 14, at 95.
38. 1 ODOFREDUS, supra note 21, at 15v.-16r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, §§ 13-14); see also
PLACENTINUS, supra note 20, at 416 (“Likewise a custom is more proved and more outstanding
if it had been confirmed in some contentious litigation.” [“Item probatior erit atq[ue]
pr[a]estantior consuetudo, si aliquando fuit confirmata contradicto iudicio.”]).
39. WAELKENS, supra note 29, at 487 (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 3) (“Unde quando dicitur
esse consuetudinem, querunt isti laici: ‘Vidistis unquam iudicare?’”).
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so universally followed that they had never been litigated were the
ones that demonstrated the greatest degree of consent.40
Nonetheless, the standard trope about ascertaining the existence
of custom included the assumption that litigation would play a role.
The Ordinary Gloss, repeated by other jurists, asked, “[I]n what way
is a custom introduced during a decade? Answer: if it was twice
adjudicated in that time, or a judge rejected a libellus or a complaint
arguing against such custom.”41 In addition, Révigny floated the
argument that tacit consent was established if someone did an act
contrary to the custom and the community sanctioned him for it.42
Eventually, the jurists settled upon the rule that two judicial
decisions within ten years sufficed to establish a custom.43 But what
role did those decisions play? Were they evidence of a preexisting
custom, or were they constitutive of it? The jurists debated the
question. The Ordinary Gloss could only explain that a suit over the
existence of a custom is not judged by examples (exemplis)—which
could mean proof or could mean prior judgments44—but by custom,
which is proved by examples (again, exemplis). But the Gloss goes
on to admit on this point that, “yes, what is not conceded directly is
to some extent conceded indirectly.”45 Odofredus stated that “[i]f the
judge should rule the custom is that you cannot sue for that which
you seek from me, then it is declared by that judgment whether
there is a custom ... because the sentence should declare [the

40. Id. at 488 (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 3) (“[M]aior est consensus quam si esset sic inter
plures et pluries iudicatum.”).
41. GLOSSA ORDINARIA at Dig. 1.3.32 ad v. inveterata (“[Q]ualiter decennio consuetudo
introducitur? Respon. si bis fuerit iudicatum in illo tempore, vel libellus, vel querimoniam
propositam contra talem consuetudinem spreuerit iudex.”); 1 ODOFREDUS, supra note 21, at
16r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 16).
42. WAELKENS, supra note 29, at 488-90 (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 4) (arguing both sides
of the proposition).
43. Mayali, supra note 21, at 30; cf. Gordon R. Woodman, Some Realism About Customary
Law: The West African Experience, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 128, 133 (comparing theory that multiple
court decisions are required before custom is “notorious” with reality that reference to a single
prior decision concerning custom is nonprecedential but influential evidence of its existence).
44. The Latin texts are ambiguous on this issue because the word used to describe the
earlier opinions, “exemplum,” could be translated variously as “example,” “evidence,” “proof,”
or “precedent.”
45. GLOSSA ORDINARIA at Cod. 8.52(53).1 ad v. quae sit longa consuetudo (“Nunquid ergo
iudicatur exemplis? Respon. non ... sed ex consuetudine, qua probatur exe[m]plis & sic
conceditur aliquid per obliquum, quod directo non conceditur.”).
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custom].”46 A later jurist explained, “It is true that a judicial act
introduces a custom, not ... because the judgment is the cause of the
custom but because from these acts it is easier to identify the tacit
consent of the people.”47
Despite the leading role played by judges in establishing custom,
the community did not entirely lose its voice. While the litigants
were bound to the holding,48 the rest of the community was not. If
a judge expressed a custom, his ruling became an authoritative
statement of the law only if the community remained silent about
it.49 Objecting to the decision removed the presumption of consent
that the opinion created.50
To offer one final example, the medieval jurists even identified
the paradox that some recent authors have pointed out is inherent
in the act-plus-opinio iuris definition of custom.51 If custom requires
acts and either consent to be bound or a sense of obligation, then the
first actor cannot be following a custom; if he believes he is bound,
he would be in error, and according to the Romans, custom cannot
be founded on error.52 The second actor is also in error if he believes
that he is bound because the first person creates a custom, and

46. 1 ODOFREDUS, supra note 21, at 16r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 16) (“Si iudex
pronu[n]ciat co[n]suetudinem esse q[uo]d no[n] possis petere id q[uo]d a me petis: ex isto
iudicio declaratur si consuetudo est ... quia s[e]n[tent]ia debet declarare sicut.”); cf. Walden,
supra note 11, at 359 (“The principle of opinio iuris has been formulated in different ways by
different publicists, but what most of them have in common is the belief that a practice, in
order to be the expression of a custom, must be applied in the conviction that it is already
binding.... What all these approaches ... share is the belief that custom does not create new
obligations, but merely expresses existing ones; it is declaratory, not constitutive.”).
47. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 17v.-18r. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 12) (“[V]eru[m] est
q[uod] actus iudiciales inducunt [con]suetudine[m], no[n] ... iudicium sit ca[usa]
[con]suetudinis, sed q[ui]a ex illis actibus faciliter co[m]prehe[n]ditur tacitus consensus
populi.”); see Ullmann, supra note 15, at 276-77 (explaining Bartolus’s view).
48. Mayali, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting the jurist Cinus da Pistoia); Ullmann, supra note
15, at 273.
49. Ullmann, supra note 15, at 273.
50. Id. at 277-78; cf. J.A. Barnes, History in a Changing Society, 11 RHODES-LIVINGSTONE
J. 1, 5-6 (1951) (Eng.) (explaining that when a judge decided a case based on a new
interpretation of the custom, the new version would become the custom unless someone in the
community objected to the decision).
51. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom,
120 YALE L.J. 202, 210-11 (2010).
52. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 10, Dig. 1.3.39, at 14. This difficulty persists
under contemporary theories of customary international law.
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likewise the third actor, and so on.53 Bartolus encountered this
paradox when asking when the time period needed to establish a
custom began:
Some say on the day of the second act, for that is when the
people begin to consent. Before that no agreement, which does
not [yet] exist, can be established. But certainly the people are
not seen to consent by the second act, unless a certain amount
of time intervenes. The gloss and the doctors [jurists] are seen
to hold that it is the act on the first day.54

He could not, however, come up with an answer himself, falling back
on the observation that “it shall suffice if within ten years there is
a judgment. For through the running of time and repetition of the
acts the tacit consent is established that introduces a custom.”55
This introduction to the medieval juristic debates offers a glimpse
at the types of disputes that arose over the definition of custom.
Even these few examples reveal that the jurists spoke of customs as
defined things that could be captured in a judicial opinion and made
into a formal rule.56 The historical evidence we have about medieval
custom suggests, however, that any given custom was not a defined
thing but rather a more or less indeterminate set of possible conforming behaviors.57
Take, for example, the sixteenth-century custom of the town of
Douai that a testament made by a sick person was invalid unless
the sick testator was able to cross the drainage ditch in the middle
of the street without assistance.58 Suppose that the validity of a test53. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 20 (2010); WATSON, supra note 14,
at 93-94.
54. BARTOLUS, supra note 18, at 19v. (repetitio ad Dig. 1.3.32, § 15) (“Dicu[n]t q[ui]dam,
a die secundi actus, tunc [e]n[im] populus incipit [con]sentire. Ante [e]n[im] no[n] po[tes]t
p[rae]scribi [con]sensus, qui non est.... Sed certe, nec p[er] s[ecundu]m actu[m] v[idetu]r
populus [con]sentire, nisi interuenerit cursus t[em]p[or]is. Gl[ossa] & docto[res] v[ide]n[tu]r
tenere, q[uod] a die primi actus.”) (citations omitted).
55. Id. (“Quod patet ex eo q[uod] hic dicit, q[uod] sufficiat, si intra decennium sit
s[e]n[tent]iatum. Ex cursu [e]n[im] t[em]p[or]is & frequentia actuu[m] inducit tacitus
[con]sensus, q[uod] parit [con]suetudine[m].”).
56. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
58. John Gilissen, Loi et coutume: quelques aspects de l’interpénétration des sources du
droit dans l’ancien droit belge, 21 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 257, 287 (1953)
(Neth.).
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ament was litigated, and the issue turned on whether the testator
had properly followed the ditch-crossing custom. First, the court had
to determine what the custom was. Witnesses from the community
called to attest to its content might have described the behavior
variously as crossing the ditch unaided, jumping over the ditch
unaided, walking unaided from the house—or the sickbed—to the
other side of the ditch, or just crossing the street unaided. Testators
who had performed any of these behaviors may have assumed that
they met the required obligation, and their particular performance
would have colored the understanding of the custom among the
people who had witnessed their acts. In addition, acting entirely in
good faith, witnesses in pending litigation could have reported the
custom as it had been in the past when the testator acted, as it was
practiced at the time of the litigation, or as they believed it ought to
be practiced.59 All of these variants represented, at some level, the
custom of the community. If the litigation concerned a sick testator
who did no more than take a single step across the ditch unaided,
did that fall within the custom? What about the testator who walked
unaided across a street that had no drainage ditch in the middle?
What about a testator who, some time earlier, had stepped over the
drainage ditch when the custom had since evolved to require
jumping over? Witnesses, relying only on their own experiences and
memories, might not have agreed on the answers.
Without the aid of written rules, decrees of a lord or community
council, or decisions of a court, the fact that a community had
engaged in a behavior for a very long time—perhaps even feeling at
some unarticulated level that it must engage in that behavior—did
not necessarily mean that the members of the community were
consciously aware of what constituted conforming behavior—that is,
of what acts fell within or without the boundaries of the custom.
Thus, custom often had far greater malleability and indefiniteness
than we, who are used to more bounded rules of law, might anticipate.
Such flexibility allowed medieval courts and juries to introduce
equity into their decision making.60 In the courts of English manors,
59. Sally Falk Moore, History and the Redefinition of Custom on Kilimanjaro, in HISTORY
277, 299 (June
Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989).
60. See, e.g., Lloyd Bonfield, The Nature of Customary Law in the Manor Courts of
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for instance, the juries “remembered” custom in a way that resulted
in the outcome they preferred given the facts of the case and the
status of the litigants.61 They sought to craft a solution that they
perceived as optimal for the future, while justifying that decision
based on a claim that it represented continuity with the past.62 Such
a practice suggests that appeals to custom were little more than a
way to place limits around the community’s sense of fairness and
equity.
Because custom arose from behavior not necessarily expressed in
words, it was ripe for manipulation—even invention—when the
time came to prove a custom in a dispute. Medieval litigants, after
all, chose to adduce or deny customs for the same reason that modern litigants choose to adduce or deny the applicability of laws: they
did what they thought necessary to win their suits.63 In the preface
to his thirteenth-century Customs of Lérida, Guillelmus Botetus
claimed that he had been moved to collect the city’s customs in
writing in order to stop the evil machinations of “those who, when
the custom was in their favor, affirmed the custom. But in a similar
case, when the custom went against them, they declared it was not
the custom.”64 Such strategic maneuvering is evident in an 1197
charter of Guilhem VIII of Montpellier, who, in order to remove his
daughter and sole legitimate child from the line of succession,
claimed an “undoubted and age-old custom” that females could not

Medieval England, 31 COMP. STUD. IN SOC. & HIST. 514, 521 (1989); R.C. van Caenegem,
Aantekeningen bij het middeleeuwsche gewoonterecht, 64 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 97, 106 (1996) (Neth.).
61. See Bonfield, supra note 60, at 521, 531.
62. David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW, supra
note 7, at 151, 174-75 (“That something was customary was a backward-looking reason for a
forward-looking conclusion, and the more the conclusion was desired the flimsier might be the
reason provide[d] for treating it as law.”).
63. Cf. Moore, supra note 59, at 287 (“It goes without saying that the Chagga know as well
as anyone else that there are occasions when it is convenient to invoke tradition to obtain
property. For other purposes, the very same people are likely to say that times have changed
and new ways of doing things are more appropriate. The choice of the ‘modern’ perspective or
the ‘traditional’ is often clearly a matter of strategy.”).
64. GUILLELMUS BOTETUS, COSTUMBRES DE LÉRIDA 17 (Pilar Loscertales de Valdeavellano
ed., 1946) (“dedi aliquantulam operam ut consuetudines ciuitatis uarias et diuersas in unum
colligerem et scriptis comprehenderem ut aufferretur quibusdam occasio malignandi qui
quando erat pro eis consuetudo et esse consuetudinem affirmabant. Si contra eos in consimili
casu allegabatur non esse consuetudinem asserebant.”).
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inherit real property or jurisdiction.65 The actual custom, however,
appears to have been the opposite.66
One also finds the common run of cases in which the opposing
parties asserted, with witnesses, two generally contrary statements
of a supposed custom. In a 1319 appeal from a lower court ruling
concerning the repayment of debts, each side alleged contrary but
supposedly notorious procedural customs. The Parlement of Paris
ordered an inquest to be taken from witnesses for each side. The
witnesses for the plaintiff all agreed to his version of the custom.
However, the witnesses for the defendant could not unanimously
agree on the statement of the custom he had proposed, so he lost his
case.67
As the juristic commentaries suggested, to turn a constellation of
conforming behaviors—ones that the community tacitly understood
itself to be bound to perform—into a legal rule, the custom probably
had to be raised in a dispute before a sanctioning body, such as a
lord, a court, or even just the opinion makers of the community. At
this point, some designated members of the community would have
to articulate the acts making up the behavior, but, as discussed
above, they could do so in multiple ways while remaining true to
their perception of the custom. This possibility would account for the
variations—whether made in good or bad faith—in the description
of a custom that litigants might offer. The sanctioning body took the
articulation, or articulations, and formed a formal, express rule from
it. Thus, once a court, for instance, opined on the terms of a custom,
that custom took on a more rule-like nature. Each subsequent
lawsuit served to further define the boundaries of this rule-custom

65. LIBER INSTRUMENTORUM MEMORALIUM: CARTULAIRE DES GUILLEMS DE MONTPELLIER
353 (Montpellier, La Société Archéologique de Montpellier 1884) (“indubitata et inveterata
consuetudo”).
66. See LE PETIT THALAMUS DE MONTPELLIER art. 13, at 8 (Jean Martel ainé, La Société
Archéologique de Montpellier 1840). Professor Kadens thanks Elizabeth Haluska-Rausch for
these references.
67. 2 LES OLIM OU REGISTRES DES ARRÊTS 678-81 (J-C. Beugnot ed., Imprimerie Royale
1842); see also 2 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 86-88 (Hubert Hall ed.,
1930) (describing a fourteenth-century dispute over a custom concerning distraining a foreign
merchant’s goods); Alain Wijffels, Business Relations Between Merchants in Sixteenth-Century
Belgian Practice-Orientated Civil Law Literature, in FROM LEX MERCATORIA TO COMMERCIAL
LAW 255, 270 (Vito Piergiovanni ed., 2005) (describing a sixteenth-century dispute over an
Antwerp custom concerning a thief in the chain of title).
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in a process very similar to the functioning of the English common
law.
However, stating custom as a rule did not necessarily mean that
the constellation of conforming behaviors disappeared. The statement of the custom as a legal rule may well have progressively
narrowed the allowable variance within which the behaviors could
be viewed as conforming, but that variance continued to allow for
some degree of evolution that could be incorporated into reformulating the rule each time it was litigated. Consequently, the two forms
influenced each other, as Philippe de Beaumanoir, a thirteenthcentury French judge and government official, noted. The author of
a major compilation of the customs of the county of Clermont,
Beaumanoir lamented that, although the customs of the county
were as he stated them when he wrote his customal, they might
evolve into something different in the future.68
All of this assumes that a custom will get litigated. Yet, custom
flourishes as a source of law in small and closely knit communities,
which often do not share the modern needs for fixed laws and
winners and losers.69 These communities are, instead, generally
more concerned with maintaining relationships, which tends to
mean that disputes are resolved equitably with an eye toward
restoring the peace rather than establishing rights and rules.70 In
such a society, the number of lawsuits brought about well-known
customs might be very small, thus limiting the opportunity to fix the
terms of custom as a legal rule.71 Indeed, one might even conjecture
that the only times well-established customs were litigated were at
moments when social, economic, or political changes caused the
community’s consensus about the custom to break down. In other
words, as long as the custom functioned well, it might not have been
contested. Thus, variant yet acceptably conforming behaviors might
have been permitted to flourish under the rubric of “the custom.”
This was, apparently, the situation in early twentieth-century
68. PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR, THE COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS OF PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR
¶ 1982, at 725 (F.R.P. Akehurst ed. & trans., 1992); see also David Ibbetson, Law and Custom:
Insurance in Sixteenth-Century England, 29 J. LEGAL HIST. 291, 305 (2008) (discussing
customs concerning life insurance that changed in the twenty years after a compilation of
insurance customs was written in London in the late sixteenth century).
69. WATSON, supra note 14, at 98.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 98-99.
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Andorra. Attempting to record the Andorran customs, the French
archivist J.A. Brutails asked “prominent people, magistrates, former
magistrates, and judges to enunciate a widow’s rights in the
property of her deceased husband, [and] he received five different
answers.”72 Such custom might come into question only when consensus about some related right or duty began to break down.
Thus, the theory of custom developed by the medieval jurists
proved unsatisfying not only in the abstract school discussions but
also in its relationship with the reality of custom as lived in medieval society. The neat distinctions over which the jurists skirmished
did not usefully describe the distinction between the customs people
followed in their daily lives and those same customs expressed as
legal rules in judicial opinions. And yet it was this medieval theory,
designed to explain the local law governing individuals in small
communities in which the citizens could mimic and police each
others’ behavior, that the early modern jurists adopted, by way of
analogy, to explain the law governing states.73 The theory did not,
as one of the fathers of international law would discover, make for
a particularly smooth transition.
Over three centuries after the heyday of the medieval debates
about custom, Francisco Suárez wrote in his Treatise on Laws and
God the Lawgiver that the ius gentium—the law of nations—
consisted of customs to which the nations of the world agreed and
adhered.74 Suárez arrived at this theory in two steps. First he
divided law into two mutually exclusive categories: “natural and
positive, properly so called, or into divine and human law.”75 The ius
gentium could not be natural law because natural law was necessary, mandatory, and immutable, whereas the law of nations was
not immutable in that human institutions and human needs created

72. Id. at 96-97.
73. See Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Analogy Between Natural Persons and International
Persons in the Law of Nations, 26 YALE L.J. 564, 564-80 (1917); see also Randall Lesaffer,
Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive
Prescription, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25, 40-46 (2005) (discussing the use of the Roman private law
concept of res nullius in customary international law adjudication over territorial rights).
74. 2 SUÁREZ, supra note 9, at 347 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 8) (stating that one type of ius gentium
“is the law which all the various peoples and nations ought to observe in their relations with
each other”).
75. Id. at 344 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 4).

2013] HOW CUSTOMARY IS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?

901

it.76 Consequently, the ius gentium had to be human and positive
law.77
The ius gentium was distinguishable from the civil law because
the latter governed only individual states intra se whereas the ius
gentium, properly understood,78 governed the interactions of states
inter se.79 In addition, whereas civil law could be written (lex) or
unwritten (custom) the ius gentium was only unwritten. As only
customary law was unwritten, the ius gentium had to arise from
custom.80
In addition to discussing the ius gentium, Suárez devoted another
hundred pages to explaining what he meant by custom. He closely
followed the lines set out by the earlier jurists.81 Indeed, Suárez
repeatedly cited not the legal writers of his time but the civil- and
canon-law jurists of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
centuries, including the Romanists Bartolus; Bartolus’s famous
student, Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400); Baldus’s contemporary,
Antonius de Butrio (1338-1408); and Rochus Curtius (fl. 1470-1515);
and the canonists Henry of Segusio, usually called Hostiensis
(c. 1200-1271); and Nicolaus de Tudeschis, usually called
Panormitanus (1386-1445). Relying on these sources, Suárez
rehearsed the medieval arguments about the distinction between
repeat usage and customary law,82 distinguishing between the
factual aspect of frequent acts repeated over a long duration and
what he called the “moral” or “binding” aspect that created law.83
This binding aspect derived from the requirement of tacit consent.84
76. Id. at 342 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 2).
77. Id. at 343 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 3).
78. Id. at 347 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 8); id. at 351 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 1) (explaining that the ius
gentium “properly so called” is that which arises to govern the interactions between states).
79. Id. at 345 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 5).
80. Id. at 345 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 6).
81. Walden, supra note 11, at 345 (mentioning Suárez’s theory as “characteristic” of the
medieval approach to custom).
82. 2 SUÁREZ, supra note 9, at 442-45 (bk. 7, ch. 2, §§ 1-4).
83. Id. at 445-46 (bk. 7, ch. 2, § 5); 1 id. at 772 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 4) (“[M]oralem facultatem,
aut vinculum, quod ius appellamus.”).
84. 2 id. at 511 (bk. 7, ch. 8, § 9) (duration); id. at 529 (bk. 7, ch. 10, § 1) (repetition); id.
at 531 (bk. 7, ch. 10, § 3) (frequency). In addition, Suárez analyzes other matters discussed
by the jurists, such as whether custom had to be unwritten, the distinction between custom
and prescription, the role of judges, and the relationship between custom and statute law. In
each of these he followed the late medieval writers.
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Suárez arrived at the same conclusion as his medieval authorities:
that custom functioned as law when a community with law-making
power came to freely accept as binding reasonable acts repeated
over time.85
Suárez claimed that the ius gentium was true custom. It was
unwritten law introduced by usages, and the same definition that
he applied to local customs he held also to be “strictly applicable to
the ius gentium.”86 In the chapter on the law of nations, he described
the ius gentium as arising from usage and tradition, “gradually
introduced throughout the whole world, through a successive
process, by means of propagation and mutual imitation among the
nations, and without any special and simultaneous compact or
consent on the part of all peoples.”87 This description suggests that
Suárez shared the medieval jurists’ image of the evolutionary
formation of customary law. But the description does not fully
square with his other statements about the customary law of
nations.
Upon returning to the question of the ius gentium in the chapter
on custom, Suárez hesitated to equate it fully with what he
denominated “common” or local custom.88 He explained that the ius
gentium was “a certain kind of custom”89 that differed from the
customs of towns or provinces in that, being related to the natural
law, it was both universal and necessary “since on no other basis
than that of necessity could it be introduced by mankind.”90 The
characteristic of necessity permitted Suárez to explain how all
nations of the world could arrive at the same custom: they had to
have this custom to function as part of the community of nations.91
In the same way, Suárez spoke of a sort of quasi-ius gentium
composed of civil laws that all nations shared: a “ius gentium intra
se.”92 The similarities in that case were merely coincidental—and
not always more than superficial93—and could be traced not to
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 444-47 (bk. 7, ch. 1, §§ 4-8); id. at 462 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 10).
Id. at 459 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 7).
Id. at 351 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 1).
Id. at 459 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 7).
1 id. at 779 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 7) (“re vera ius gentium consuetudo quaedam est”).
2 id. at 459-60 (bk. 7, ch. 3, § 7).
Id. at 342 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 2).
Id. at 351 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 1).
Id. (“[T]he resemblance is not always perfect, but lies only in a certain general and
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countries’ needs to have a law governing their relations with each
other but rather to the fact that similar countries had similar needs
in their internal laws.94 However, the characteristic of necessity,
which Suárez also attributed to natural law, created the problem
that nations could neither give their free consent nor develop their
law through repeat behavior if that law was, from the first, necessary. But if the ius gentium truly were custom, it would have to
rest precisely on repeat acts and voluntary, tacit consent.
Perhaps understanding this paradox, in his chapter on the ius
gentium, Suárez specifically pointed out that the law of nations was
not, in fact, fully necessary, at least not in the same way natural law
was, because the ius gentium was not immutable “to the same degree as the natural law.”95 “[I]mmutability,” wrote Suárez, “springs
from necessity; and therefore, that which is not equally necessary
cannot be equally immutable.”96 Natural law was absolutely necessary; it could not be changed by the decisions of men. If a nation
failed to follow the natural law, the nation was in error.97 By
contrast, the ius gentium was “subject to change, in so far as it [was]
dependent upon the consent of men,” and it was dependent upon
consent, because that was part of what made it human and positive
law.98 Men could change the law of nations because “the things
prohibited by the ius gentium are not, absolutely speaking, evil (in
themselves and intrinsically).”99 Indeed, countries could, without
repercussions, choose not to observe the ius gentium because it was
“not observed always, and by all nations, but [only] as a general
rule, and by almost all .... Hence, that which is held among some
peoples to be ius gentium, may elsewhere and without fault fail to
be observed.”100
But this acknowledgement that the ius gentium was not, in
practice, universal or fully necessary created other conflicts with the
claim that it arose from custom. First, in the medieval juristic
theory that Suárez otherwise endorsed, custom was established
common character.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 342 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 2).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 354 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 6).
99. Id. at 355.
100. Id. at 342 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 2).
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through tacit consent that bound all the members of the community—even when only a majority of them agreed that the custom
was obligatory. However, if the ius gentium were customary, and the
community of nations were the community bound to the custom,
then all nations should be bound to follow the custom as law—
whether they wanted to or not—once the requisite majority of states
had tacitly agreed that the behavior in question was a custom.
Should a country not follow the custom, it would be at fault. Suárez,
however, emphasized that it was not.101 He pointed, for example, to
the custom, which was part of the law of nations, that the citizens
of states vanquished in war could be enslaved. He allowed, nonetheless, that it was perfectly acceptable for states to pass internal laws
prohibiting such slavery.102 He also discussed the process by which
the ius gentium could change, describing specifically how states
could act contrary to an existing custom and over time generalize
that new behavior.103 Yet if the ius gentium were binding custom,
then the countries adopting the new behavior would be in violation
of the law.
Second, Suárez assumed that nations adopted the ius gentium
customs because these customs facilitated interactions with other
states, and also in part because the customs accorded with reason.
These customs were the “few” rules that states would choose to
follow merely as a matter of common sense.104 But this is different
101. Id. at 466-67 (bk. 7, ch. 4, §§ 6-7).
102. Id. at 356 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 8); id. at 466 (bk. 7, ch. 4, § 6).
103. Id. at 356 (bk. 2, ch. 20, § 8).
104. See id. at 349 (bk. 2, ch. 19, § 9) (“[A]lthough a given sovereign state ... may constitute
a perfect community in itself ... nevertheless, each one of these states is also ... a member of
[the] universal society; for these states when standing alone are never so self-sufficient that
they do not require some mutual assistance, association, and intercourse .... Consequently,
such communities have need of some system of law whereby they may be directed and
properly ordered with regard to this kind of intercourse and association; and although that
guidance is in large measure provided by natural reason, it is not provided in sufficient
measure and in a direct manner with respect to all matters; therefore, it was possible for
certain special rules of law to be introduced through the practice of these same nations. For
just as in one state or province law is introduced by custom, so among the human race as a
whole it was possible for laws to be introduced by the habitual conduct of nations. This was
the more feasible because the matters comprised within the law in question are few, very
closely related to natural law and most easily deduced therefrom in a manner so
advantageous and so in harmony with nature itself that, while this derivation [if the law of
nations from natural law] may not be self-evident—that is, not essentially and absolutely
required for moral rectitude—it is nevertheless quite in accord with nature, and universally
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from saying that the nations tacitly agreed that they must abide by
these behaviors.
Not all early modern jurists accepted Suárez’s equation of the ius
gentium and custom.105 Nearly one hundred years after Suárez
wrote, another natural law theorist, Christian Thomasius (16551728), attacked Suárez’s theory on several grounds. First,
Thomasius was skeptical that the ius gentium could arise from
custom. In his 1688 Institutes of Divine Jurisprudence, he tried out
the argument that “[t]here is no unwritten law outside of a commonwealth. For custom is law because of the tacit approbation of the
prince. When that is lacking, the custom is called [of fact]. Yet
where among nations do we find the tacit approbation of a
prince?”106
Seventeen years later, in his Foundations of the Law of Nature
and Nations, Thomasius took a slightly different tack. While still
concluding that custom could not produce the ius gentium, he focused on the lack “of a deed by the nations from which [the necessary] tacit agreement could be proved.”107 He also argued that
imitation does not “produce an obligation in matters that are freely
chosen.”108 Finally, he made a point that directly attacked Suárez’s
analysis: because custom reflects a longstanding behavior, it gives
permission to continue that behavior but does not create an
obligation to continue or even to undertake it.109
These two well-known texts do not exhaust Thomasius’s criticism
of the idea that the law of nations was customary law. In 1699, he
presided over the dissertation of a student, Peter Herff, for the
degree of license in law.110 In the dissertation text, Herff—who made
it clear that he was following Thomasius—disdained those who
claimed that the ius gentium derived from custom:
acceptable for its own sake.”).
105. Walden, supra note 11, at 346-47.
106. CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, INSTITUTES OF DIVINE JURISPRUDENCE, WITH SELECTIONS FROM
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 107, § 109 (Thomas Ahnert ed. & trans.,
2011).
107. Id. at 620, § 77.
108. Id.
109. Id. at § 78.
110. CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS & PETRUS HERFF, DISSERTATIO INAUGURALIS IURIDICA, SISTENS
CONIECTURAS DE IURE CONSUETUDINIS ET OBSERVANTIAE 8 (Halle Magdeburg, Christiani
Ludovici Sympheri 1740) (originally 1699).
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[T]hey wished to imagine the ius gentium to be a species of
human law, but being at a loss, sought refuge in customary law
and thought, for example, that certain nations had uniformly
introduced by uniform acts the inviolability of ambassadors, and
thus the rest [of the nations] should be bound to the same law
because custom is a type of unwritten law.111

This could not be true, he concluded, because “customary law does
not exist among nations.”112 Indeed, he added, “customary law is not
as great as commonly imagined even within the commonwealth.”113
Thomasius was something of an iconoclast. He was, for example,
the first person to give his law lectures in German rather than in
Latin.114 But in the case of the ius gentium, Thomasius was on to
something. If hundreds of years of juristic debate could not come up
with a satisfactory yardstick by which to measure whether certain
behavior constituted a custom, and if the apparent customs declared
by premodern judges really amounted to the selection of one expression among a range of possible conforming behaviors, then why
should we expect international custom to be any easier to define and
any more certain than the customs of a small, homogeneous world
in which custom formed the most vital source of law?
II. THE HISTORY OF CUSTOM AND CURRENT DEBATES ABOUT
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
What, if anything, can this survey of the historical development
of customary law tell us about current debates over the content and
import of customary international law? As we hope to have made
clear, the history of customary law indicates a longstanding struggle
to find a cogent and functional definition of custom. The signal
lesson is one of indeterminacy. For present purposes, we focus on
111. Id. (“Quamuis enim deprehensi fuerint viri quidam eruditi, qui, dum Ius Gentium
Iuris humani speciem effingere voluerunt, & iis aqua haesit, in iure consuetudinario refugium
quaesiuerunt, atque putarunt v.g. quod gentes quaedam uniformiter legatorum
inviolabilitatem uniformibus actibus introduxerint, & sic reliqui obligati sint ad idem ius, cum
consuetudo sit species iuris non scripti.”).
112. Id. (“Consuetudinarium jus inter Gentes nullum esse.”).
113. Id. (“Consuetudinarium jus inter Gentes nullum esse. Quodsi iam deduxerimus,
consuetudinarium ius etiam in ciuitate tanti non esse, quanti communiter esse fingitur, majus
inde responsioni robur accedet.”).
114. THOMASIUS, supra note 106, at xi.
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three salient uncertainties: First, the jurists could not satisfactorily
explain how a mere practice turned into a binding custom. Second,
the contrast between the medieval jurists’ theories of custom and
the actual practice of courts and juries both undermines whatever
clarity one might glean from the theories themselves and highlights
the malleability of customary law in practice. Third, the striking
difference between the type of issues typically governed by custom
and the substance of current disputes about customary international law calls into question whether a legal theory designed for
one type of society can appropriately be translated to a markedly
different context.
A. Practice and the Extra Ingredient
As the medieval jurists recognized, not every practice creates a
binding custom.115 Professor Young buys a medium size (grande)
vanilla latte with skim milk nearly every morning, but even though
he is profoundly a creature of habit he nonetheless does not feel
bound by this practice.116 The central problem of custom concerns
the “extra ingredient” necessary to transform a repetitive practice
into a binding norm.117 And a central lesson of our historical discussion is that this has always been the central problem. At various
times, jurists have relied on (1) the practice’s antiquity (has it been
done “from time immemorial”?); (2) the sense that the practice is
done out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio iuris); (3) the practice’s
substantive virtue (for example, its reasonableness or consistency
with natural law); or (4) the tacit consent of actors to be bound by
the practice.
The accepted formulation in current international practice is that
customary international law derives from state practice plus opinio
iuris. The American Restatement, for example, says that “[c]ustomary international law results from a general and consistent practice

115. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
116. It is conceivable that, some fine morning, he might go crazy and buy a white chocolate
mocha. With whipped cream and sprinkles, even.
117. See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 53, at 4 (“A theme that runs throughout this volume
is to identify ... the ‘extra ingredient’ that converts a helpful or gracious usage or practice into
a binding norm of customary law.”).
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of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”118 That,
as we have said, was the way that the Roman jurists defined custom, but that formulation was then unpacked into the various
factors just listed. At various times, different commentators—and
sometimes the same commentators—stressed different elements.
Suárez, for instance, emphasized consent in certain places and, in
other places, the “necessity” of the practice.119
The same problems plague contemporary discussions. As Patrick
Kelly has observed, “[c]ustomary law theory is indeterminate, not
just because its application requires discretion, but because there is
no common understanding of how to determine customary norms.”120
Sometimes opinio iuris is inferred from regular practice, which
follows the medieval jurists’ focus on acts but effectively does away
with the subjective element altogether.121 More often nowadays,
opinio iuris is found in normative statements—U.N. General
Assembly Resolutions, aspirational treaty language, and the like.122
Such statements, which are generally divorced from actual state
practice, are more like statements about the moral obligation or
reasonableness of a principle than they are an account of why states
do what they do.123 Moreover, phenomena like ius cogens norms,
which are supposedly not subject to consent or derogation,124 look a
lot like natural law to laypeople not steeped in international law
theory.125 Yet acts now prohibited by the ius cogens norms, such as
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
119. See supra notes 88-91, 95-101 and accompanying text.
120. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449,
516 (2000); see also Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 385-91 (2002).
121. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 88 (1992) (“What
international courts and tribunals mainly did in fact was to trace the subjective element by
way of discerning certain recurrent patterns within the raw material of State practice and
interpreting those patterns as resulting from juridical considerations.”).
122. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 758; Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 89-90.
123. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L
L. 101, 102 (1987) (criticizing the World Court’s decision in Nicaragua v. United States,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
181 (June 27), for allowing abstract statements of opinio iuris to trump actual practice).
124. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, GERALD L. NEUMAN, DIANE F. ORENTLICHER & DAVID W.
LEEBRON, HUMAN RIGHTS 355 (1999); Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 103-05.
125. And sometimes even to international law experts. Cf. Louis Henkin, International
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slavery, may, a few centuries ago, have been fully acceptable elements of international law.126
Each of the potential extra ingredients identified in the historical
literature has its problems when we try to apply it to contemporary
matters of customary international law. Antiquity, although useful
in some contexts, is unlikely to appeal to most advocates of international custom, who tend to see customary international law as an
instrument of reform.127 The point of international human rights
litigation seeking to enforce customary international law, for example, is not to preserve existing arrangements and practices but
rather to overthrow unjust practices in the name of an emerging—
and more morally appealing—international consensus.128 Custom,
however, is by definition backward looking and conservative. It
represents the behavior of a community over a long period of time.
The sad truth in much of the world may be that practices dating
from time immemorial are customs we would prefer to forget, but to
call more acceptable but new practices “custom” is to undermine the
meaning of the word.129
Law: Politics, Values and Functions: General Course in Public International Law, 216
RECUEIL DES COURS 61-62 (1989) (Neth.) (“[P]rinciples common to legal systems often reflect
natural law principles that underlie international law.”).
126. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Frohnen, supra note 4, at 40 (“International law increasingly is aimed at
changing the practices of local cultures to bring them more in line with universal principles
of human rights.”); Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 83, 88-90 (discussing the strong
tendency in contemporary international law to depart from historical conceptions of custom
in order to spur reform of practices detrimental to human rights).
128. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2009)
(considering Alien Tort Statute (ATS) suit challenging war crimes by the Sudanese
government as violations of international human rights law); John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering ATS suit challenging human rights abuses by the
Myanmar military committed in conjunction with the building of a natural gas pipeline);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (challenging torture by the Paraguayan
government under principles of customary international law).
129. See Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 96 (“[I]t is surely open to doubt whether the
concept of custom should be so fundamentally reshaped in a manner which disregards its
intrinsic limitations (and some would say, virtues) in order to accommodate a desired (and
highly admirable) policy outcome.”). A parallel problem arises in American constitutional law
when the Due Process Clause is invoked to strike down measures such as antisodomy laws.
As Cass Sunstein has explained, due process protects customary or traditional rights against
outlier jurisdictions that may wish to infringe on them, while the Equal Protection Clause
requires the revision of existing social norms to include previously excluded minority
perspectives. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). Due
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Opinio iuris, as we have already suggested and as the jurists
realized, is hard to measure directly. If it is inferred from practice,
then it simply begs the question which practices should be considered binding. If it is based on abstract statements, then it is not
really an account of customary behavior at all and risks giving legal
effect to “cheap talk.”130 Moreover, too loose a conception of opinio
iuris risks creating counterproductive incentives whereby states
may avoid engaging in desirable behavior at all lest that behavior
come to be seen as legally binding upon them.
If we focus instead on the reasonableness of a custom or its
consistency with broader notions of morality or natural law, we run
into Thomasius’s problem: the lack of any central authority to determine what is reasonable or moral.131 Certainly, as the community of
nations to be bound by norms of customary international law expands, we can expect ever less consensus on general principles of
reasonableness, let alone on the content of a natural law.132
Finally, there are serious difficulties with the very idea of tacit
consent regardless of how that consent is measured. That is particularly true for Americans, whose Constitution is practically obsessed with the particular forms and procedures by which binding
law is generated.133 What is the point, for example, of requiring twothirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty if the President may also bind
the nation to an international obligation simply by engaging or
declining to engage in a particular practice, or by failing to object to
process, in other words, is ordinarily a form of customary law, while equal protection
generally undermines custom in the name of reform. That is not to say that due process may
not be used to upset traditional restrictions on rights. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578-79 (2003) (striking down a Texas antisodomy law under the Due Process Clause). But
in order to do so it must be cut loose from its customary moorings and transformed into a
relatively abstract principle of “liberty.” See id. at 558-62.
130. See D’Amato, supra note 123, at 102 (“[O]pinio iuris is a psychological element
associated with the formation of a customary rule as a characterization of state practice.”).
131. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
132. Cf. BEDERMAN, supra note 53, at 42 (noting that “scholars question whether custom
is inimical to modern legal cultures characterized by a large, diffuse, mobile, technologically
sophisticated, and diverse society”); Robert P. George, Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 55, 64
(2007) (acknowledging that “in circumstances of political liberty reasonable people of goodwill
can be expected to develop divergent views even about some profoundly important moral
matters”).
133. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (striking down the “legislative
veto” procedure on the ground that it departed from the very specific law-making procedures
set forth in Article I of the Constitution).
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the emergence of a practice in other countries? A similar problem
bedevils any democratic regime committed to notions of parliamentary sovereignty, whereby the people’s elected representatives retain the right to unmake any legal obligation that they can make.134
More generally, process safeguards that restrict the formation of
binding law often operate to ensure deliberation and widespread
participation, including by less powerful groups.135 More informal
forms of norm generation, such as the formation of international
custom through tacit consent, may sacrifice these values.136 It is no
surprise, for example, to encounter concerns that customary norms
may reflect the practices and preferences of strong nations, because
weaker states may have little opportunity and strong disincentives
to object.137
Our basic point, however, is that while the details may have
changed, the thrust of these critiques of customary-law formation
have been around for more than half a millennium. There is, if you
will, no settled customary practice governing how to define customary rules of law.
B. The Theory and Practice of Custom
The second ambiguity that emerges from our historical discussion
deals with the disconnect between theory and practice in the historical materials. While the jurists debated the proper ingredients
of custom, judges and juries applied custom as a form of rough
justice in particular cases, informed by the particular values of the
134. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 51, at 204-05, 218-19. Of course, a treaty may
also bind a government in a way that prohibits a successor government from easily
withdrawing. But at least in that instance, most governments will have built-in safeguards
for entering into treaties. They will also have the opportunity—and frequently the
incentive—to negotiate specific exit options in the treaty itself. Id. at 204.
135. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1321 (2001).
136. See Kelly, supra note 120, at 517 (charging that customary law formation “violates
fundamental procedural values, including democratic governance, and cannot function ... in
a decentralized community with widely different values and perceptions”).
137. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 51, at 230-31; Kelly, supra note 120, at 472
(“The practices and attitudes of Japan, China, and the many nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America are virtually ignored in the Western literature.”); Roberts, supra note 13, at 767
(“[M]ost customs are found to exist on the basis of practice by fewer than a dozen states.”).

912

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:885

frequently small and close-knit communities in question.138
Although this approach may have reached fair results in individual
cases, it failed to generate a determinate body of rules.139
This historical disconnect raises problems of both indeterminacy
and community. The indeterminacy problem is that, in the absence
of clear rules of custom, individual courts are likely to emulate
medieval juries and impose their own sense of rough justice. The
lack of a settled methodology for deriving customary rules in the
first place,140 of course, exacerbates the problem. Given the wealth
of practices and statements of opinio iuris from which to choose,
courts are likely to find some support for the results that they may
wish to reach on more intuitive grounds.141
Within a small and close-knit community, a form of customary
law derived from the community’s sense of justice may be accepted
as legitimate.142 But as we extend the sphere of that law’s application to the international “community” at large, courts are less likely
to find either shared values or a broader sense of reciprocity that
would allow for give and take in particular disputes.143 In the famous Sabbatino case,144 for example, Justice Harlan was reluctant
to review the Castro regime’s seizure of private property under
customary international law norms barring expropriation:
There are few if any issues in international law today on
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens. There is, of
course, authority, in international judicial and arbitral decisions,
in the expressions of national governments, and among commentators for the view that a taking is improper under international
138. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 120, at 475 (“[T]here is no methodology that has the
capacity to determine whether states have, in fact accepted a norm as law.”).
141. See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 51, at 213 & nn.40-43 (noting the various ways
in which opinio iuris is determined by different parties); Kelly, supra note 120, at 484-86
(discussing “new CIL” theory that uses UN resolutions as indicators of custom).
142. See Ullmann, supra note 15, at 265-66 (noting that each individual Italian community
and village possessed its own distinct and individual customs).
143. See, e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 94-95 (criticizing the current
Restatement’s treatment of human rights under customary international law as reflecting
“normative chauvinism” because it “assum[es] that American values are synonymous with
those reflected in international law”).
144. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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law if it is not for a public purpose, is discriminatory, or is
without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. However, Communist countries ... commonly recognize no
obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain representatives of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries
have questioned whether rules of state responsibility toward
aliens can bind nations that have not consented to them and it
is argued that the traditionally articulated standards governing
expropriation of property reflect ‘imperialist’ interests and are
inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent states.145

There was, in other words, no international “community” with respect to the issue of expropriation, notwithstanding the availability
of much traditional evidence of a custom sharply limiting the
practice.146
The community problem plagues any system of law that purports
to operate at a level that lacks either a shared sense of political and
cultural identity or a common set of democratic institutions. The literature on the European Union, for example, has long wrestled with
the EU’s lack of a common demos and the corresponding “democratic
deficit” of law promulgated at the European level.147 This problem
may be minimized in treaty law, in which more particular communities may explicitly consent to specific obligations through defined
procedures. The difficulty creeps back in as treaties become broader,
more multilateral, and more abstract. In such cases, vague terms
will often have to be given content through the same kinds of
analysis that are used to define custom.148 In any event, the problem
reaches its maximum with pure customary law. Historical experience suggests that the success of such law may depend on a much
thicker set of communal ties than the abstract theories of the jurists
145. Id. at 428-30 (footnotes omitted).
146. See Ernest A. Young, The Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal
Judicial Power in Foreign Relations Cases, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 415, 429-32 (Vicki
Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (discussing the Court’s reasons for avoiding customary
international law in Sabbatino).
147. See, e.g., NEIL FLIGSTEIN, EURO-CLASH: THE EU, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, AND THE FUTURE
OF EUROPE 2-6 (2008); Amitai Etzioni, EU: Closing the Community Deficit, 43
INTERECONOMICS 324 (2008).
148. Cf. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter “are phrased in broad generalities” and
thus “do not create rights enforceable by private litigants in American courts”).
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might suggest. The prospects for international custom must be
assessed in light of actual experience, not just theory.
C. Customary Law and Contemporary Human Rights
The last set of difficulties arises not so much from the historical
record itself but rather from the striking differences between the
settings in which customary law traditionally arose and the issues
on which it spoke, on the one hand, and the contemporary settings
in which advocates of customary international law seek to employ
customary norms, on the other. Simply put, the fact that relatively
small and homogeneous communities have sometimes been able to
rely on something they called custom—but which may in reality
have been little more than non-rule-based, equitable decision
making—to decide disputes about intestate succession of property
or commercial dealings at merchant fairs does not mean that custom
is a good way to handle international human rights, which is currently the most important area in which lawyers and scholars seek
to employ customary international law.149 Some of the most pressing
questions in international human rights litigation, for example, are
simply not questions that custom can readily answer. Other questions are not the sort of matters on which international actors are
likely to accept a customary answer simply because it is settled;
indeed, a model of adherence to settled practices may be antithetical
to what human rights advocates hope to achieve. Finally, the decentralized mechanisms by which judges seek to define custom and
enforce it in particular cases may be a poor institutional approach
to resolving disputes about international human rights.
Consider, for instance, the issue raised by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., which the Supreme Court reheard in October 2012.150
Kiobel involved allegations that Royal Dutch Petroleum and its
subsidiaries aided and abetted human rights violations by the
149. Cf. Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 83-84 (noting the sensitivity of human rights
issues to states and the concomitant lack of strong enforcement, and concluding that “if, for
systemic or regime reasons, we really consider human rights treaties to be different from
‘normal’ international treaties, we should, for those very reasons, approach the question of the
existence, or rather, the viability, of an extensive customary law of human rights with equal
caution”).
150. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), and reh’g ordered, 132
S. Ct. 1738 (2012).
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Nigerian government, including extrajudicial killings, torture,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and destruction of property.151 These
violations allegedly occurred as part of an effort, encouraged by the
oil companies, to suppress resistance to oil exploration by indigenous people in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.152 Residents of that
region filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),153 which
confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts over “any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”154 The question on which
the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari is whether the ATS
permits suit against a corporation, as opposed to individual defendants.155
Judge Cabranes’s opinion for the panel majority in the Second
Circuit sought to answer this question as a matter of customary
international law. He considered the rulings of various international
tribunals, such as the Nuremberg judgments and rulings by the
international criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, noting
that no such tribunal had ever issued a judgment against a corporate defendant.156 He likewise found little evidence in other
sources of international law, such as international treaties and
scholarly writings, for corporate liability.157 The important point for
present purposes, however, is simply that this sort of question—
about who can violate international law and the reach of legal
remedies—is hardly the same sort of question as who can inherit
property or how to treat a merchant’s failure to deliver the right
kind of goods. Nor is it the same as the matters of fundamental
sovereignty, such as the treatment of ambassadors, that formed the
earliest and most widely recognized customary international laws.158

151. Id. at 123.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 124.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
155. For a brief statement of the questions presented and links to the briefs and other
relevant materials, see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
156. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132-37.
157. Id. at 137-39, 142-45.
158. See Kelly, supra note 120, at 480.
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Judge Cabranes did not seek to give legal effect to the practices of
nonjudicial actors; rather, he looked for a legal custom, as it were.
The point is not that Judge Cabranes was wrong to look to
international law;159 it is, rather, that the customary practices of
nations could not provide the answer to his question. Scholars have
generally distinguished customary law from common law—that is,
law made by courts rather than derived from the practices of
nonjudicial actors.160 As we have already discussed, the medieval
jurists did not consider judicial decisions themselves to establish
custom.161
It is true that courts must frequently answer the sort of question
posed by Kiobel. Procedural and remedial schemes frequently have
gaps, and courts must fill them as needed to establish a functioning
legal system. But in the federal system that inquiry is ordinarily
done as a matter of federal common law; courts fill statutory gaps
by reference to the purposes and policies of the legal system, not
generally by reference to practices extraneous to that system.162
Hence, in Sabbatino, Justice Harlan articulated a federal common
law “act of state” doctrine as a means of protecting the separation
of powers values associated with political-branch control of foreign
policy—not because the act of state doctrine could be derived from
international custom.163 When an international court decides
whether to impose liability on a corporate defendant, for example,
it may be interpreting its own enabling treaties or simply relying on
general principles and policies, but it is not a participant in the
formation of customary law in the same way that a nation is. And
159. To the extent that the law of nations limits who can be a defendant, the ATS would
seem to incorporate any such limitation. That is not to say, however, that domestic law
considerations should not also play a role in describing the federal right of action in ATS
cases. This is not the place to examine the proper resolution of Kiobel’s question. Our point
is simply that that question was of a different order than the matters to which customary
practice can speak.
160. See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 53, at 27-37 (observing that although English jurists
sometimes viewed the common law itself as a customary regime, in practice the central issue
concerned when local customs and practices ought to be allowed to derogate from the common
law as found by judges).
161. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
162. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 607-742
(6th ed. 2003).
163. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964).
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when a nation’s domestic courts make this determination in ordinary domestic litigation, they will not generally be doing so as part
of an internationally directed process, much less out of any opinio
iuris sense that their resolution of the question is directed by
international law.
Many of the critical questions in international human rights
litigation have this sort of nonsubstantive quality. They involve the
scope of liability and the remedies available for violations of international law, not the first order questions of what conduct violates
that law.164 It is unclear that customary practices will be much help
in answering these questions. And to the extent that a body of international common-law principles does emerge purporting to govern
these issues, it will require some ground of authority other than
international custom.
A second quality of the issues historically settled by custom is
that they were worked out through interactions among the participants in the customary regime and, in most cases, it was more important that the relevant principles be settled than that they be
settled right. This was certainly true of many commercial customs,
which can after all be contracted around if the participants only
knew what the baseline entitlements were. But as Bruno Simma
and Philip Alston have pointed out, human rights norms generally
arise in contexts in which states interact with individuals, not other
states; they thus lack the “essential” element of iterative interaction
among the parties to be bound by customary practice.165 More important, principles of human rights—like many of the subjects upon
which contemporary internationalists invoke customary norms
—implicate serious normative disagreements that participants in
the legal system are unlikely to compromise in the interest of
establishing a settled rule.
William Fletcher’s work on the general law merchant in the
nineteenth-century United States, for example, suggests that the
164. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (ordering the parties
to brief additional issues on reargument).
165. Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 99 (“[O]ne reason why the claims to the existence
of ... substantive human rights obligations under customary law remain unconvincing, and
even do violence to some degree, to the established formal criteria of custom, can be seen in
the fact than an element of interaction ... is intrinsic to, and essential to, the kind of State
practice leading to the formation of customary international law.”).
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Swift v. Tyson166 regime—under which state and federal courts
shared the development of the general commercial law without any
single tribunal having authority to bind the others—held together
as well as it did because the subject matter placed a premium on
stability and did not implicate strong normative commitments.167
Many of the issues upon which customary international law is
invoked today, however, do not have this quality; indeed, they involve some of the most strongly normative principles imaginable.168
Customary law cases will thus frequently involve deep normative
disagreements—for example, the legitimacy of expropriation or
capital punishment, the scope of religious liberty, or race and gender
equality. Few will agree that it is more important that these questions be settled than that they be settled right, and diverse actors
are thus far less likely to acquiesce in the development of customary
norms to govern such matters.169
A related point concerns the office that customary law is expected
to perform vis-à-vis the subjects that it regulates. In a classic
intravillage dispute decided according to customary principles, the
idea is that the parties’ dispute should be resolved according to the
ways things have generally been done. Custom’s purpose, in other
words, is to reflect practice—not reform it—and the court’s job is
simply to resolve a disagreement about what the normal way of
doing things actually is. As we have already noted, however, the role
of international human rights law is frequently to challenge existing
arrangements and practices. It is an odd thing, to say the least, to
invoke custom to challenge conditions in oppressive societies or the
abuses of long-entrenched despotic regimes. That is no doubt why
human rights advocates so frequently seek to define the content of
customary law by reference to aspirational documents like General
166. 41 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1842).
167. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1562-63 (1984).
168. See Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 85 (describing international human rights as
“a field ... torn by ideology and politics, and ... replete with hypocrisy, double standards and
second thoughts”); Young, supra note 120, at 498-503 (applying Fletcher’s framework to
contemporary CIL issues).
169. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1792 (1997) (noting that the Swift regime fell
apart when courts sought to extend the “general common law” beyond the relatively narrow
compass of commercial cases to more normatively contested matters, such as tort law).
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Assembly resolutions or the open-ended provisions of treaties like
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.170 But these are
aspirations, not practices, and therefore not customs. Aspirational
declarations surely have their place, and there is reason to believe
that over the long term they create pressure for reform.171 Our point
is simply that calling such principles “customs” is a misnomer, and
we might achieve the laudable purposes of international human
rights law more simply by forthright efforts to tighten the binding
force of international agreements embodying reformist principles.172
Finally, there is the institutional question: Are domestic courts a
good instrument for enforcing international human rights law,
especially in cases involving foreign defendants or conduct occurring
in a foreign nation? As Professor Young has described at greater
length elsewhere, the ATS is effectively a civil-side, universal jurisdiction statute. It arguably permits U.S. courts to address human
rights abuses anywhere in the world so long as the federal court can
find some hook for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.173 As
such, the ATS is unique in all the world. But as Justice Harlan
warned in Sabbatino, calling upon federal courts to distill international custom, especially on divisive issues and in the absence of
clear rules of international law, may undermine the national
political branches’ ability to conduct foreign policy.174 After all,
Article I designates Congress as the primary branch with authority
170. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. On the
force of the Declaration, compare ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD
299 (1986) (insisting that “in formal terms, [the Universal Declaration] is not legally binding,
but possesses only moral and political force”), with Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding
Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 147-48 (1987) (asserting that “the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has come to be regarded as an authoritative articulation of customary
international law, at least with respect to the most fundamental rights, no matter how
widespread or persistent the nonconforming state conduct may be” (emphasis added)).
171. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 263-64 (2005) (citing
aspirational views of democracy as important driving factors to ending the Cold War).
172. Cf. Simma & Alston, supra note 121, at 87 (suggesting that nations that have been
reluctant to ratify or strengthen the enforcement provisions of human rights treaties are
unlikely to vigorously act to enforce customary norms of human rights).
173. See Ernest A. Young, Universal Civil Jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). For some cautions about universal
jurisdiction, see Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 323, 323-26.
174. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
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not only to “punish” but also to “define ... offenses against the law
of nations.”175
Anyone reviewing the facts and implications of a case like
Sabbatino or Kiobel can hardly ignore how very far we have strayed
from the classic disputes resolved under customary law in the
Middle Ages. This observation is not necessarily to say that contemporary human rights disputes should not be resolved under
principles derived from the practice and policy statements of nations
rather than from express international agreements; it is to say that
such resolutions would not be customary.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary practice of customary international law derives
much of its force from the assumption that it is a continuation of
long-standing theories and practices. That is quite true, but perhaps
not in the way that modern scholars have assumed. Our project here
has been to demonstrate that medieval jurists had the same
disputes, and the same doubts, about custom that plague contemporary lawyers, and they never came to an adequate resolution that
can serve as a foundation for contemporary practice. The modern
practice, moreover, has stretched the bounds of custom into territory
where those doubts become all the more salient. It may well be that
unwritten principles of international law can be justified on grounds
other than custom, or even that a theory of international custom can
be developed on grounds other than the historical account. Without
such an effort, however, the customary international law of human
rights rests on a shaky foundation.

175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

